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I. Introduction: 
 
The enlargement process activities represent an aspect of the EU’s Common Foreign 
and  Security  Policy  (CFSP),  though  institutionally  placed  into  First  Pillar.  The 
Western Balkans provide in this respect for an interesting setting to observe unique 
aspects of the EU’s CFSP with regard to the enlargement prospects of the relevant 
nations as a tool for stabilisation of the region.  
 
Currently we are awaiting a UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution regarding the 
future  status  of  the  southern  Serbian  province  Kosovo,  presently  under  the 
administration  of  the  UN  Mission  in  Kosovo  (UNMIK),  pursuant  to  UNSC 
Resolution 1244 (1999). The long-awaited proposal by the United Nations special 
envoy  Martti  Ahtisaari  is  expected  to  confirm  the  international  community’s 
expectations of a strong future role of the EU in the implementation of the decision.
1 
For its part, the EU already began discussing Kosovo’s accession prospects at the 
Thessaloniki European Council in 2003.  
 
At the same time Serbia has been trying to establish a new government ever since 
elections on 21 January of this year. In April, Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn 
warned Serbian political leaders of the negative effects of this delay for the further 
negotiations on a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA).
2 The EU has also 
made  it  clear  that  the  reopening  of  the  negotiations  is  only  possible  if  the  new 
government proves to be pro-European and “provided it shows a clear commitment 
and takes concrete and effective action for full co-operation with the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia”. The negotiations adjourned last year 
because of the EU’s dissatisfaction with the Serbian government’s efforts to locate 
and transfer war crime suspects (including Mladić) to the Yugoslavia Tribunal.  
 
At the time, the SAA prospects for Bosnia and Herzegovina also do not seem very 
tangible. During the election campaign a lot of nationalist rhetoric could be heard, and 
                                                 
1 See UN Security Council, Letter dated 26 March 2007 from the Secretary-General Addressed to the President of 
the Security Council (S/2007/168) and Addendum: Comprehensive Proposal for the Kosovo Status Settlement 
(S/2007/168/Add. 1). 
2 Rehn renews call to Serbia to form government, Enlargement Newsletter, 25 April 2007; Serbia's EU perspective 
can  help  it  "raise  its  sights",  Enlargement  Newsletter,  27  March  2007.    Newsletters  are  available  at  : 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/newsletter/index_en.htm. If the agreement on the new government is 
not reached by 14 May, the president has to call new elections.    4 
with the stagnation of the reforms the political climate has become very tense again. 
Among  other  shortcomings,  the  cooperation  with  the  Yugoslav  Tribunal  has  been 
assessed as insufficient, in particular with regard to the Entity Republika Srbska.
3  
 
The opposite can be observed for the youngest state on the Balkan. On 16 March 
Montenegro  initialed  its  SAA,  and  EU  Member  States  are  expected  to  sign  the 
agreement already this summer.
4 At the same time, though, it was reported that this 
May  the  country  signed  an  impunity  agreement  with  the  USA  concerning  the 
International  Criminal  Court,
5  thereby  acting  against  one  of  the  EU’s  important 
concerns.  
 
Already  enjoying  the  status  of  candidate  countries  are  Croatia  and  the  Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The latter was granted the status by the European 
Council of 17 December 2005, while Croatia was awarded the candidate status on 18 
June 2003 at the Thessaloniki summit and is expected to be the next new member of 
the Union. With regard to Albania, the country signed an SAA with the EU on 12 
June 2006.  
 
The foregoing summary of current events indicates the complexity of the situation the 
EU is dealing with on the Balkans. Currently, it seems that, apart from Croatia and 
partly  Montenegro  and  Macedonia,  the  countries  are  still  far  away  from  any 
meaningful prospects regarding European integration. A detailed overview of all of 
the intricacies and activities of the European Union’s foreign policy in the Western 
Balkans is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, the following discussion addresses 
the main institutional and legal issues with regard to the process of integration for the 
countries  of  the  Western  Balkans.  This  process,  the  Stabilization  and  Association 
Process (SAP), is a precondition to enlargement procedures. In the light of the current 
events, the final part addresses the particularities of the role foreseen for the EU in 
Kosovo.   
 
 
                                                 
3 Time for Bosnia and Herzegovina to get serious, says Rehn, Enlargement Newsletter, 27 March 2007. 
4 Montenegro initials Stabilisation and Association Agreement, Enlargement Newsletter, 27 March 2007. 
5  Radulović:  Sporazum  nije  tajna,  Radio  televizija  Črne  Gore,  
http://www.rtcg.cg.yu/index.php?akcija=vijesti&id=23441 (8.5.2007).    5 
II. Stabilization and Association Process (SAP)  
 
1. From a Regional Approach to SAP  
 
It  is  generally  agreed  that  the  EU  was  not  able  to  achieve  an  efficient  common 
position and strategy with regard to the Balkan crises in the first half of the 1990s, 
although the Treaty of Maastricht laid down some duties for Member States with 
regard  to  the  intergovernmental  form  of  CFSP  under  Art.  11  TEU.
6  But  whereas 
within the Community Pillar Member States are bound by the principle of cooperation 
in Art. 10 EC, the CFSP duties only reach to the general duties of Art. 11(2) TEU to 
“support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit 
of loyalty and mutual solidarity”, to “work together to enhance and develop their 
mutual political solidarity” and to “refrain from any action which is contrary to the 
interests  of  the  Union  or  likely  to  impair  its  effectiveness  as  a  cohesive  force  in 
international relations.” Therefore it was not until the post-Dayton era that the EU was 
able to come up with a common position (strategy) towards the countries of former 
Yugoslavia and, because of geographical closeness and similar needs for a general 
political and economical reform, also Albania.  
 
Following the Commission’s report of 14 February 1996 on the prospects for the 
development  of  regional  cooperation  for  the  former  Yugoslavia  and  what  the 
Community should do to foster cooperation,
7 the Council of General Affairs on 26 
February defined the so-called “regional approach” for the five countries for which 
the EC has not yet adopted directives for negotiations of the association agreements. 
The Council considered the future agreements with these countries as “a substantial 
incentive to political stability and as an instrument for economic development and 
cooperation between them, between those countries and their neighbours, and with the 
European  Union.”  The  conclusion  of  such  an  agreement  was  conditioned  on  “the 
                                                 
6 R Kocjančič, ‘Stabilisierungs- und Assoziierungsprozess auf dem Gebiet des ehemaligen Jugoslawien’ 66 (2006) 
ZaöRV  438;  F  Hoffmeister,  ‘Die  Beziehungen  der  Europäischen  Union  zu  den  Staaten  des  Westbalkans’  in 
Kadelbach (eds.), Die Außenbeziehungen der Europäischen Union (2006) 125; C Pippan, ‘The Rocky Road to 
Europe;  The  EU’s  Stabilisation  and  Association  Process  for  the  Western  Balkans  and  the  Principle  of 
Conditionality’ 9 (2004) EFA Rev 221. 
7 COM(96) 476 final.   6 
willingness of the countries concerned to work towards consolidating peace and to 
respect human rights, the rights of minorities and democratic principles.”
8  
 
Concreter political and economic conditions were then defined by the General Affairs 
Council on 29 April 1997.
9 They included: the facilitation of the refugees’ return; 
readmission of a country’s own nationals who were at the time illegally present in the 
countries  of  the  EU;  compliance  with  the  obligations  of  the  peace  agreements; 
cooperation  with  the  ICTY;  commitment  to  democratic  reforms;  compliance  with 
human and minority rights standards; free and fair elections, non-discrimination of 
minorities;  independent  media;  initiation  of  economic  reform;  proven  readiness  to 
enter  into  good  relations  with  their  neighbours;  and  compatibility  of  agreements 
between parties involved in the war with the Dayton peace agreements.  
 
At the time, the political and economic development in the countries was at different 
levels. In order to maintain a coherent approach for the region but at the same time to 
differentiate between the countries based on level of development and capability to 
undertake  reform,  the  EU  developed  a  graduated  approach.  The  level  a  country’s 
fulfilment of conditions defined its level of cooperation with the EC. The approach 
begins  with  autonomous  trade  preferences  for  the  lowest  level  of  conditionality 
compliance, followed by financial and technical support, and reaching as the highest 
cooperation level the conclusion of an agreement.
10 The approach that EU/EC has 
taken towards the Western Balkan remains within the general framework of political 
conditionality  in  the  EU’s  development  cooperation  towards  the  countries  of  the 
South. However, differences pertain to additional specific conditionality with regard 
to  the  special  problems  of  each  country,  here,  for  instance,  cooperation  with  the 
ICTY.
11 However, the problem with this “regional, graduated approach” was that, 
while  the  conditions  the  countries  were  to  comply  with  were  relatively  clear,  the 
                                                 
8 Bull. EU 1/2-1996, point 1.4.108. For concreter guidelines cf. Commission’s report to the Council and European 
Parliament  on  “Common  principles  for  future  contractual  relations  with  certain  countries  in  South-Eastern 
Europe”, 2 October 1996; COM(96) 476 final.   
9 “Conclusions on the Principle of Conditionality Governing the Development of the European Union’s Relations 
with Certain Contries of South-Eastern Europe”; Bull. EU 4-1997, point 2.2.1.   
10 For a detailed analysis cf. Pippan (n. 6 above), 222 f.  
11 E G Fierro, The EU's Approach to Human Rights Conditionality in Practice (2003) 165.   7 
obligations of the EC towards them were vaguely defined and did not provide enough 
incentive to contribute to the desired reforms in the region.
12   
 
At the beginning of the EU’s regional policy towards the Balkans, the perspective of 
full  integration  was  not  mentioned.  It  was  not  until  1999  that  the  EU  showed 
willingness to consider the full integration of these countries into the Union. The 
change  in  the  approach  was  phrased  in  para.  7  of  the  preamble  of  the  Common 
Position concerning the launch of the Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, also 
with  the  first  explicit  mentioning  of  the  Copenhagen  Criteria.
13  In  the  Common 
Position the EU bound itself to draw “the region closer to the perspective of full 
integration of these countries into its structures through a new kind of contractual 
relationship, taking into account the individual situation of each country, with the 
perspective of European Union membership on the basis of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
and once the Copenhagen criteria have been met.”
14 In the same month the European 
Commission  then  proposed  a  new  approach  towards  the  region,  the  so-called 
Stabilization and Association Process (SAP)
15 with the prospect of EU integration, 
which was confirmed one month later by the General Affairs Council.
16 An explicit 
mention of potential EU membership for all the countries of the Western Balkans was 
later confirmed at the meeting of the European Council at Santa Maria da Feira on 19 
and 20 June 2000,
17 at the Zagreb Summit on 24 November 2000, where the countries 
of the Western Balkans also committed themselves to the European Perspective,
18 and 
at the Thessaloniki Summit on 16 June 2003.
19  
                                                 
12 Hoffmeister (n. 7 above), 128; cp. First Conditionality Report of 3 October 1997; Second Conditionality Report 
of 30 March 1998; Third Conditionality Report of 19 October 1998; Fourth Conditionality Report of 17 May 
1999;  Fifth  Conditionality  Report  of  9  February  2000.  Reports  available  at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/key_documents/sap_en.htm.  
13 Copenhagen European Concil, Presidency Conclusions, 21 June 1993; Bull. EU 6-1993, point 13. To join the 
EU, a new Member State must meet three criteria: 
– political: stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and 
protection of minorities;  
– economic: existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union;  
– acceptance of the Community acquis: ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence to 
the aims of political, economic and monetary union.  
For the European Council to decide to open negotiations, the political criterion must be satisfied. 
14 Common Position of 17 May 1999 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 15 of the Treaty on European 
Union, concerning a Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe, (1999/345/CFSP); OJ 1999 L 133/1. 
15 Operational Conclusions (COM (1999) 235 final.) of 26 May 1999. 
16  Conclusions  of  the  General  Affairs  Council  of  21/22  June  1999. 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/09008.EN9.htm.  
17 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00200-r1.en0.htm.  
18  http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accession_process/how_does_a_country_join_the_eu/sap/ 
zagreb_summit_en.htm.  
19 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/gena/76201.pdf.    8 
2. SAP and the Accession Perspective  
 
The instruments of the SAP are threefold, and, as the previous instruments, they are 
based  on  the  gradual  approach.  The  countries  are  offered  trade  concessions 
(Autonomous  Trade  Measures  –  ATMs),  economic  and  financial  assistance  and 
contractual relationships (Stabilisation and Association Agreement).  
 
Trade preferences 
Trade  preferences  represent  the  lowest  level  of  cooperation  within  the  SAP 
framework.  With  a  2000  EU  Council  regulation,  the  countries  received  duty-  and 
quota-free  access  to  the  EU  market  for  their  industrial  products  and  almost  all 
agricultural  products.
20  Since  these  preferences  were  introduced  by  a  Community 
regulation and not by a bilateral agreement/treaty, the Community has no obligation 
towards the countries to uphold the preferences but has the discretion to suspend them 
at any time if any of the countries regresses in the fulfillment of criteria.
21 According 
to the Commission, ATMs have in the period of 2000-2004 contributed to an average 
annual increase of 8% in the Western Balkans’ exports to the EU.
22 
 
Financial Assistance 
While  until  2006  the  EC  had  not  differentiated  between  candidate  and  potential 
candidate  countries  in  providing  the  economic  and  financial  assistance  under  the 
CARDS
23 (the financial instrument developed for the Western Balkans that replaced 
OBNOVA
24),  in  2006  a  new  instrument  was  introduced  to  replace  not  just  the 
Western Balkans’ programme but all other pre-accession instruments. The so-called 
IPA, Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance came into force on 1 January 2007.
25 
The  regulation  based  on  Art.  181a  TEC  (Measures  for  economic,  financial  and 
technical  cooperation  with third  countries)  upholds  the  1997  Council criteria  with 
                                                 
20 Council regulation (EC) No. 2007/2000 introducing exceptional trade measures for countries and territories 
participating in or linked to the Stabilisation and Association Process, OJ 2000 L 240/1. At first, the Serbian part of 
FYROM  was  excluded.  The  extension  to  the  whole  country was  introduced  after  the  political  change  in  the 
republic.  Coucil  Regulation (EC)  No.  2563/2000,  OJ  2000  L 295/1.  In  2005 they  were  extended  until  2010. 
Council Regulation (EC) No 1946/2005, OJ 2005 L 312/1 
21 cf. Pippan (n. 6 above), 231. 
22 Communication of the Commission, The Western Balkans on the road to the EU: consolidating stability and 
raising prosperity, COM(2006) 27 final of 27 January 2006.  
23  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  2666/2000  of  5  December  2000  on  assistance  for  Albania,  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, OJ 
2000 L 306/1. Offically this instrument ended in 2006.  
24 Regulation (EC) No 1628/96 ('Obnova regulation'): OJ 1996 L 204/1.  
25  Council  Regulation  (EC)  No  1085/2006  of  17  July  2006  establishing  an  Instrument  for  Pre-Accession 
Assistance (IPA), OJ 2006 L 210/82.   9 
regard to the Western Balkans.
26 The candidate countries are listed in Annex I of the 
regulation (Croatia, Turkey, and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia) while 
Annex  II  lists  the  remaining  potential  candidate  countries  (Albania,  Bosnia, 
Montenegro and Serbia, including Kosovo as defined in UNSCR 1244). 
 
The objective was released to improve the efficiency of the EC’s External Aid, and its 
main objective is the “progressive alignment of the beneficiary countries with the 
standards and policies of the European Union, including where appropriate the acquis 
communautaire with a view to membership.”
27 The foreseen assistance is divided into 
five areas: Transition Assistance and Institution Building; Cross-Border Cooperation; 
Regional  Development;  Human  Resources  Development;  and  Rural  Development 
(Art.  3).  Assistance  is  to  be  provided  within  the  framework  of  the  European 
(candidate countries) and Accession (potential candidate countries) Partnerships (Art. 
4). It is to be planned in view of the Copenhagen Criteria, the country’s progress and 
either  the  progress  made  in  the  adoption  and  implementation  of  the  acqius 
communautaire and regional cooperation of the candidate countries or the progress in 
implementing  the  stabilisation  and  association  agreements,  including  regional 
cooperation,  for  the  potential  candidate  countries.  The  first  two  components, 
Transition  Assistance  and  Institution  Building  and  Cross-Border  Cooperation,  are 
available  to  all  countries  whereas  Regional  Development,  Human  Resources 
Development and Rural Development are only available to candidate countries (Art. 
8-12).  Assistance  may  be  used  to  finance  various  projects,  including  investments, 
procurement  contracts,  grants  including  interest  rate  subsidies,  special  loans,  loan 
guarantees  and  financial  assistance,  budgetary  support,  other  specific  forms  of 
budgetary  aid,  and  the  contribution  to  the  capital  of  international  financial 
organisations or regional development banks, whereas the budgetary support is to be 
granted only in exceptional cases (Art. 15). The implementation of assistance occurs 
on the basis of framework implementation agreements (Art. 17). With regard to the 
subject  of  this  paper,  the  most  interesting  part  is  the clause  on  suspension  of  the 
assistance (Art. 21). In this clause, respect for democratic principles, the rule of law, 
human rights, minority rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as the Council’s 
conclusions of 29 April 1997, are stressed as the essential elements for the application 
                                                 
26 Council Regulation 1085/2006, Art. 21.  
27 Recital 30.   10 
of the regulation and the granting of the assistance. If the Commission determines that 
the  decisive  country  has  failed  to  respect  the  essential  principles  or  its  progress 
towards  fulfilment  of  the  accession  criteria  is  insufficient,  it  may  propose  to  the 
Council that it suspend assistance. The Council may decide to do so by qualified 
majority.               
 
The regulation does not make reference to the European Agency for Reconstruction 
seated in Thessaloniki that was later established with the aim of facilitating projects 
under CARDS. Its mandate is supposed to terminate after all the CARDS projects are 
completed, prospectively at the end of 2008.
28 
 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) 
The  most  prominent  of  the  instruments  are  the  Stabilisation  and  Association 
Agreements, foreseen in Art. 310 TEC, which covers association agreements. They 
are  comparable  to  the  so-called  Europe  Agreements  that  were  concluded  with 
candidate countries from Central and Eastern Europe though they differ from them in 
many respects.
29 The SAAs are “mixed agreements”, thereby concluded between the 
given  country  and  the  EC  and  its  Member  States.  For  the  agreement  to  become 
effective it has to be approved by the Council, which first has to obtain the assent of 
the European Parliament according to Art. 300 (3) TEC, and ratified by all Member 
States. For the transition period before the SAA enters into force, the Commission has 
introduced  the  practice  of  concluding  Interim  Agreements  on  Trade  and  Trade-
Related Matters with the respective country.  
 
The very designation of the SAA already indicates that the emphasis is not only on the 
association but even more importantly the stabilisation of the region. By naming these 
agreements  differently  from  those  with  Central-European  countries  the  EU  (also 
because of lack of consensus among members on further enlargement) reaffirmed that 
the SAAs do not necessarily lead to membership, as was the case with the Europe 
Agreements. Therefore the countries who have signed these agreements are still also 
regarded only as “potential candidates”, and the agreements as such do not provide for 
                                                 
28 Interview with Daniel Giuglaris, Head of the Agency’s Operational Centre in Belgrade, Politika, 08/01/2007, 
http://www.ear.europa.eu/publications/main/EAR-
InterviewwithDanielGiuglarisHeadofEARsOperationalCentreinBelgrade-08012007.htm.  
29  For  comparison:  D  Phinnenmore,  ‘Stabilisation  and  Assosiation  Agreements:  Europe  Agremments  for  the 
Western Balkans’, 8 (2003) EFA Rev 77.   11 
a potential membership claim of the non-member country. Moreover the agreements 
concluded  thus  far  with  FYROM
30,  Croatia
31  and  Albania
32  do  not  include  any 
provision  that  would  indicate  how  the  SAA  could  contribute  to  achieving 
membership.
33 Although in the case of Croatia the country was at the time of signing 
the  SAA  already  given  candidate  status,  “efforts  to  achieve  membership”  is  not 
explicitly listed in Art. 2 among the aims of the association.   
 
As to the structure, this is quite uniform for all the SAAs so far. They are divided into 
titles,  starting  with  the  General  Principles,  Political  Dialogue  and  Regional 
Cooperation,  continuing  with  titles  relating  to  market  liberties,  Approximation  of 
Laws, Law Enforcement, Competition Rules, Justice and Home Affairs, Cooperation 
Policies, Financial Cooperation and concluding with Institutional, General and Final 
Provisions.  The  substantial  (market-related)  provisions  of  the  agreement  are 
concretised in several Annexes and Protocols.    
 
Art.  2  defines  the  terms  of  political  conditionality:  “Respect  for  the  democratic 
principles and human rights as proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and as defined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris for a New 
Europe, respect for international law principles and the rule of law as well as the 
principles  of  market  economy  as  reflected  in  the  Document  of  the  CSCE  Bonn 
Conference  on  Economic  Cooperation”  as  the  basis  of  the  domestic  and  external 
policies  and  the  essential  elements  of  the  agreement.  In  the  case  of  Croatia,  the 
association according to the agreement is to be implemented within six years (by 
2011). For Macedonia and Albania the timeframe is longer (10 years) and divided into 
two phases. After the first period of 4 years the Stabilisation and Association Council 
(SA  Council)  is  supposed  to  evaluate  the  progress  made  and  decide  whether  the 
progress was sufficient to continue with the second phase that is to lead into full 
association.  
 
The SA Councils are established by the respective institutional provisions (Art.110 of 
the SAA with Croatia, Art. 108 SAA with FYROM, Art. 116 SAA with Albania). 
                                                 
30 OJ2004 L 84/13. 
31 OJ 2005 L 26/3. 
32 Not yet published in OJ, available at: http://www.delalb.ec.europa.eu/en/documents/st08164.en06.pdf.  
33 Phinnenmore (n. 29 above) 79, 100.    12 
They  are  to  supervise  the  application  and  implementation  of  the  agreements  and 
consist  of  members  of  the  Council,  Commission  and  the  respective  country’s 
government.  The  Council  is  supported  by  the  Stabilisation  and  Association 
Committee whose duties are determined by the SA Council; the Committee can also 
create  subcommittees.  Furthermore  the  SAAs  also  established  respective  SA 
Parliamentary Committees as forums of members of the European Parliament and the 
country’s parliament. The SA Councils also have the authority to settle any potential 
disputes among the contracting parties by means of a binding decision. According to 
Art. 120 SAA  with Croatia, Art. 126 SAA with Albania and Art. 118 SAA with 
FYROM, the parties have to submit to the SA Council all the relevant information in 
cases in which they consider that the other party has failed to fulfill its obligations 
under the SAA, before they take appropriate measures, except in cases of special 
urgency. Such cases are specified in a Joint Declaration concerning the respective 
article of each SAA and refers to a material breach of the agreement by one of the two 
parties. This consists in repudiation of the agreement not sanctioned by the general 
rules of international law or violation of the essential elements of the agreement set 
out in Art. 2 of each agreement. Apart from these measures either party may also 
denounce the SAA by notifying the other Party. The denouncement becomes effective 
six months after such notification (Art. 124 SAA with Croatia, Art. 122 SAA with 
FYROM, Art. 130 SAA with Albania).   
 
3. Monitoring the SAP Results and the Reaffirmation of Membership Prospects  
 
Under  the  “Regional  Approach”  the  conditionality  compliance  of  the  Western 
Balkans  countries  has  been  monitored  by  the  so-called  “Conditionality  Reports,” 
which  have  been  released  every  6  months.
34  Following  the  shift  towards  SAP, 
progress and compliance assessment has been occurring through the Commission’s 
annual reports on SAP for South Eastern Europe. Reports on individual countries are 
complemented with a general regional report addressing the whole region.
35 In 2005 
the  reports  remained  structurally  largely  the  same  but  were  renamed  “Progress 
Reports”. The reports contain a general description of the relations between the EU 
                                                 
34 See n. 14 above.  
35 Stabilisation and Association Process for South Eastern Europe, First Annual Report, COM(2002)163 final 
3.4.2002; Stabilisation and Association Process for South Eastern Europe, Second Annual Report, COM(2003)139 
final  26.3.2003;  Stabilisation  and  Association  Process  for  South  Eastern  Europe,  Third  Annual  Report, 
COM(2004)202 final 30.03.2004.    13 
and the relevant country, analysis of the political and economical situation and the 
progress made in these respects, and review of the capacity to implement European 
standards. In addition, the reports have started to examine the extent to which the 
country has addressed the European Partnership priorities.  
 
The European Partnership is an instrument endorsed by the Thessaloniki European 
Council
36  as  proposed  by  the  Commission  in  its  Communication  “The  Western 
Balkans and European Integration”.
37 This Communication foresees new measures 
that aim at stronger support of the countries in their preparation for future integration 
within  the  SAP.  Apart  from  European  Partnerships,  they  include  strengthened 
political co-operation in the area of CFSP, enhanced support for institution building, 
increased  promotion  of  economic  development  and  opening  of  the  Community 
Programs to the respective countries.
38 Nonetheless, European Partnership is the most 
important of the instruments. According to Council Regulation No 533/2004
39 they 
are established for each country by a Council Decision and are supposed to identify, 
on a regular basis, priorities and obligations to be fulfilled.
40 Financial assistance is 
also to be distributed in accordance with these priorities. After the country has been 
given candidate status, the same priorities are drawn within the Accession Partnership.  
  
According  to  the  Commission’s  Communication  from  January  2006
41  the  SAP  as 
enhanced by the Thessaloniki Agenda “has proved an effective policy framework for 
EU action in the Western Balkans”. Furthermore the Commission has suggested new 
concrete measures for the implementation of the Agenda, including assessment of the 
capacity to integrate specific countries at all key stages in the enlargement process and 
more systematical use of concrete benchmarks that would provide for concrete criteria 
for opening and closing negotiations on individual chapters.  
 
                                                 
36  Cp.  Croatia  2005  Progress  Report,  COM  (2005)  561  final.  All  reports  available  at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/archives/key_documents/reports_2005_en.htm#strategy.  
37 COM (2003) 285 final, 21.5.2003.  
38 Τhe Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans, General Affairs & External Relations Council (GAERC), 16 
June 2003: Western Balkans - Council Conclusions, Annex A. 
39 Council Regulation (EC) No 533/2004 of 22 March 2004 on the establishment of European Partnerships in the 
framework of the stabilisation and association process, OJ 200 L 306/ 1. 
40 Cp. Council Decision 2006/55/EC of 30 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in 
the European Partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina and repealing Decision 2004/515/EC, OJ 2006 L 35/19.  
41 The Western Balkans on the road to the EU: consolidating stability and raising prosperity”, COM(2006) 27 
final, 27.1.2006.   14 
The  first  assessment  of  capacity  to  integrate  was  included  in  the  Commission’s 
Enlargement Strategy Paper of November 2006.
42 The paper was discussed at the last 
European Council in December 2006. According to the Presidency Conclusions, “the 
enlargement  strategy  based  on  consolidation,  conditionality  and  communication, 
combined  with  EU’s  capacity  to  integrate  new  members,  forms  the  basis  for  a 
renewed consensus on the enlargement.”
43 With regard to the Western Balkans, the 
European Council has reaffirmed that the Western Balkans’ future lies in the EU but 
depends on each country’s individual efforts to comply with the Copenhagen criteria 
and SAP conditionality.
44  
 
This final statement, inter alia, suggests that the EU continues to pursue the same 
policy it has had toward the Western Balkans since the “regional approach”. The most 
appropriate understanding of this policy would be to regard it as the policy of political 
and economic conditionality in exchange for political promises of membership but 
without any real legal commitment on the side of the EU ultimately to actualize these 
prospects.   
 
III. EU Role in the Future of Kosovo 
 
1. The Kosovo Status Settlement Process 
 
Currently  Kosovo  is  administered  under  Security  Council  Resolution  1244  which 
deployed international civil and security presences in Kosovo, under UN auspices. 
The Resolution was passed after the second Kosovo crisis in 1999 led to NATO air-
strikes which in turn led to the removal of Yugoslav forces from the region. The 
Resolution also established civilian executive powers in the form of United Nations 
                                                 
42 Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2006 – 2007, COM(2006) 649, 8.11.2006 
43 Presidency Conclusion 4. EU enlargement policy is today based on three basic principles: consolidation of 
commitments, conditionality and communication. 
“Consolidation  of  the  EU  enlargement  agenda  means  that  the  Union  is  cautious  about  assuming  any  new 
commitments, but honours its existing commitments towards countries already in the enlargement process. The EU 
has  started  accession  negotiations  with  Turkey  and  Croatia  and  offered  a  European  perspective  to  the  other 
countries  of  the  Western  Balkans.  This  commitment  is  a  strong  incentive  for  the  countries  to  continue  their 
reforms.  
Rigorous but fair conditionality is applied to all candidate and potential candidate countries. Every step forward 
depends  on  each  country’s  own  progress  in  meeting  the  necessary  conditions  at  each  stage  of  the  accession 
process. This approach helps to consolidate reforms and to prepare new Member States to fulfil their obligations 
upon accession.  
For enlargement to be a success, the EU must ensure the support of its citizens. Member States need to take the 
lead in communicating effectively the enlargement process and in particular the benefits that it offers for EU 
citizens. Democratic legitimacy remains essential for the EU accession process.” COM (2006) 649, p. 5. 
44 Presidency Conclusion 8.   15 
Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and an international military 
presence, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), a NATO-led international force responsible for 
establishing  and  maintaining  security  in  Kosovo.  UNMIK  comprises  four  Pillars 
under UN leadership: (1) Police and Justice and (2) Civil Administration, both of 
which are under the direct responsibility of the United Nations, (3) Democratisation 
and  Institution-Building  under  the  responsibility  of  the  OSCE,  and  (4)  Economic 
Reconstruction, Recovery and Development under the responsibility of the EU.  
 
Resolution 1244 also included general principles on a political solution to the Kosovo 
crisis as adopted by G-8 foreign ministers, but gave almost no guidance on how the 
settlement of the future status could develop. After almost 3 years of international 
presence  and  without  any  official  statement  on  the  status  issue  in  2002,  Michael 
Steiner, the Special Representative of the Secretary General at that time in Kosovo, 
proposed  the  so-called  “standard  for  status”  with  a  set  of  eight  benchmarks  as  a 
precondition for even starting the talks on Kosovo’s future status. The standards were 
published  in  December  2003  and  were  supposed  to  stress  close  chronological 
relationship between the two processes.
45 But after riots in March 2004, it was clear 
that the “standards for status” approach was not tenable anymore. With support of the 
Security  Council  in  November  2005,  the  UN  Secretary-General  appointed  Martti 
Ahtisaari as the Special Envoy for the future status process of Kosovo (UNOSEK). 
His mandate was not to finalize the status decision but to bring the parties together, to 
facilitate and mediate in the direct negotiations and then to report to the Secretary-
General  and  Security  Council,  which  has  to  formally  implement  it  as  a  UNSC 
Resolution.    
Formally the talks started in February 2006 and were finished this March. The first 
draft  proposal  was  presented  on  2  February,  and  the  report  and  comprehensive 
proposals were then officially delivered to the UN Security Council on 26 March 
2007.
46  
                                                 
45 UNMIK, Standards for Kosovo, 10 December 2003, UNMIK/PR/1078. M Alfons, ‘Of Standards and Status. 
The Role the European Union in kososvo: From UNSCH 1224 to the Future Status Talks’ 54 (2006) Südosteuropa 
340.  
46 For chronological review of the process cf. UNOSEK Website: http://www.unosek.org/unosek/en/index.html.    16 
There has been much speculation about the future status of Kosovo.
47 From the public 
international law perspective it should be considered highly dubious whether granting 
Kosovo  independence  would  be  in  line  with  the  general  rules  and  principles  on 
territorial integrity and the right to self-determination since the right to secession is 
highly disputed among scholars. This is because the situation of Kosovo differs from 
the  situation  of  other  republics  of  the  former  Yugoslavia  since  only  Slovenians, 
Croats, Serbs, Bosnian Muslims, Montenegrins and Macedonians were recognized as 
peoples and thereby holders of sovereignty under the Constitution of the Socialist 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia whereas the Albanian population was defined solely 
as a nationality. Independence would also violate the highest maxim in international 
politics towards Balkans, namely the territorial integrity of the former Yugoslavian 
republics, a principle which was also repeated in Security Council Resolution 1244. 
Furthermore, the partition of the northern part of Kosovo (a majority of its population 
is Serbian) and its reunion with Serbia also seem unacceptable. However, UNOSEK 
came to the conclusion that with regard to the situation the “only viable option for 
Kosovo is independence, to be supervised for the initial period by the international 
community.”
48  
 
According to the General Principles of the Proposal, Kosovo is to be a multi-ethnic 
society,  governing  itself  democratically  and  with  full  respect  for  the  rule  of  law, 
human  rights  and  fundamental  freedoms  and  must  promote  the  peaceful  and 
prosperous existence of all its inhabitants. Kosovo is to have no territorial claims 
against any country and would not be allowed to seek union with any State or part of 
any State. The temporary supervision of the international community is foreseen with 
regard to the effective and efficient implementation of the Settlement.
49  
 
2. The EU in Kosovo 
 
Currently, apart from the EU pillar of UNMIK, the EU is also represented in Kosovo 
by  the  European  Agency  for  Reconstruction,  the  European  Commission  Liaison 
Office, the European Union Monitoring Mission, the European Union Member States’ 
                                                 
47  Alfons,  n.  45  above,  A  S  Neu,  `Das  Kosovo  und  die  Statusfrage.  Rechtliche  Reflextionen  und  politische 
Optionen, 24 (2006) Sicherheit und Frieden, 62; R N Burn, `Kosovo: Current and Future Status LVI (2005) No. 
1118, 10; V Demaj, Kosovo/a: Recht auf Unabhängigkeit? 2003. 
48 Point 5. Report of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Kosovo’`s Future Status, Recommendation, 
UNSC S/2007/168 Add. 1.  
49 Article 1, General Principles.     17 
diplomatic  representatives  and  the  Personal  Representative  of  the  EU  High 
Representative for CFSP. With more then 1.1 billion euros in assistance since 1999, 
the EU is also Kosovo’s largest single donor.   
 
According to the Ahtisaari’s proposal, in the future the Union’s role in Kosovo should 
become far more complex, since it would replace UNMIK, though with less authority. 
The responsibility for managing its own affairs and fulfilling its obligations under the 
Settlement would be given to Kosovo, whereas the supervision would be performed 
by the International Civilian Representative who would at the same time be the EU 
Special Representative, appointed by the International Steering Group (ISG)
50 and the 
Council of the EU, and would be the final authority regarding interpretation of the 
civilian aspects of the Settlement.
51 The Representative would be supported by the 
International Civilian Office, which would be smaller than the present UNMIK with a 
substantially  different  role,  since  it  would  not  have  the  executive  mandate  to 
administer Kosovo. But it would have the authority to annul all decisions it considers 
inconsistent with the Settlement.
52 Its mandate would last until the ISG determines 
that Kosovo has implemented the Settlement.
53 
The  EU  Special  Representative  would  direct  the  European  Security  and  Defence 
Policy Mission (ESDP) that would assist Kosovo in the development of effective, fair 
and representative rule-of-law of institutions with limited executive functions.
54 As 
for the international military presence, KFOR would remain in Kosovo until Kosovo’s 
own institutions were capable of providing security without assistance. For an initial 
period, an international military presence would also supervise, monitor and exercise 
executive  authority  over  a  new  Kosovo  Security  Force.
55  The  EU  Special 
Representative  would  replace  UNMIK  120  days  after  the  Settlement  entered  into 
force.
56  
 
As  for  the  Kosovo’s  prospects  for EU  membership,  the  European  Commission  in 
April 2005 adopted a Communication on “A European Future for Kosovo” in which it 
                                                 
50 France, Germany, Italy, Russia, UK, USA, EU, European Commission, NATO. 
51 Article 12. 
52 Annex IX, Article 2. 
53 Art. 12.6. 
54 Annex X, Art. 1.  
55 Annex XI, Art. 1, 2.  
56 Art. 15.1.   18 
repeated that according to the Thessaloniki Declaration the European Perspective is 
also open for Kosovo.
57 So far, two Progress Reports have been released, the latter in 
November  of  last  year.
58  In  January  2006,  the  Council  also  initiated  European 
Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by UN Security 
Council Resolution 1244.
59 
  
In the future the EU will therefore have a unique double position in Kosovo. On the 
one hand it will supervise Kosovo’s implementation of the Settlement according to 
the  UN  Security  Council  Resolution,  including  the  authority  to  annul  inconsistent 
decisions  which  will  allow  it  to  essentially  form  Kosovo’s  future  political  and 
economic development. On the other hand, the European Commission will monitor 
and  evaluate  Kosovo’s  progress  within  the  SAP  framework  and  thus  partly  also 
evaluate and asses the EU’s own achievements (and failures) in Kosovo. The question 
that arises out of this complex situation is which interests will prevail while the EU 
conducts both sets of activities. If Kosovo does not benefit sufficiently within the SAP 
framework, is it possible that the EU would nonetheless exaggerate the success, so as 
to downplay its failures or the incapacity of its Civilian Representative? Or, on the 
other hand, is it possible that the EU Civilian Representative would even use the SAP 
to put pressure on Kosovar authorities in order to strengthen its position and authority 
beyond what may be foreseen in future Security Council Resolutions? Is it possible 
that Kosovo could become some sort of a laboratory for the EU’s democracy model? 
 
IV. The Reality of the European Future for the Western Balkans  
 
To answer the question of the actual chances for full membership for the countries of 
the  Western  Balkans,  the  answer  still  depends  not  only  on  the  conditionality 
compliance of the respective countries. The countries have been promised a European 
perspective  in  many  political  statements,  but  after  analyzing  the  existing  legal 
instruments with regard to the accession of the Western Balkans, it must be concluded 
that the countries do not have any real claims against the EU with regard to their 
membership. But the reality of full accession is similar to the threat of sanctions that 
                                                 
57 COM(2005) 156 final, April 20 2005. 
58 Kosovo (under UNSCR 1244) 2006 Progress Report, COM (2006) 649 final, 08. November 2006. 
59 Council Decision 2006/56/EC of 30 January 2006 on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Serbia and Montenegro including Kosovo as defined by the United Nations Security 
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the EU can apply in cases of noncompliance. Both provide for a rather effective tool 
for political and economic reforms even if they are not realized. For now. In the 
future, though, the EU cannot afford to break its membership promises, if countries 
have fulfilled all the conditions. Doing so could even again destabilize the whole 
region.  In  addition,  the  Union  would  also  need  to  carry  the  responsibility  for 
unfulfilled promises.  
 